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1.  Introduction 
  What is a contract?  Why do people write (long-term) contracts?  The classical view held 
by economists and lawyers is that a contract provides parties with a set of rights and obligations, 
and that these rights and obligations are useful, among other things, to encourage long-term 
investments.
1  In this paper we present an alternative, and complementary, view.  We argue that a 
contract provides a reference point for the parties’ trading relationship: more precisely for their 
feelings of entitlement.  We develop a model in which a party’s ex post performance depends on 
whether the party gets what he is entitled to relative to the outcomes permitted by the contract.  
A party who is shortchanged shades on performance, which causes a deadweight loss.  One way 
the parties can reduce this deadweight loss is for them to write an ex ante contract that pins down 
future outcomes very precisely, and that therefore leaves little room for disagreement and 
aggrievement.  The drawback of such a contract is that it does not allow the parties to adjust the 
outcome to the state of the world.  We study the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility.  Our 
analysis provides a basis for long-term contracts in the absence of noncontractible relationship-
specific investments, and throws light on why simple “employment” contracts are sometimes 
optimal. 
  To motivate our work, it is useful to relate it to the literature on incomplete contracts.  A 
typical model in that literature goes as follows.  A buyer and seller meet initially.  Since the 
future is hard to anticipate, they write an incomplete contract.  As time passes and uncertainty is 
resolved, the parties can and do renegotiate their contract, in a Coasian fashion, to generate an ex 
post efficient outcome.  However, as a consequence of this renegotiation, each party shares some 
of the benefits of prior (noncontractible) relationship-specific investments with the other party.  
                                                           
1 For up-to-date syntheses of the classical view, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) and Shavell (2004). 2 
Recognizing this, each party underinvests ex ante.  The literature studies how the allocation of 
asset ownership and formal control rights can reduce this underinvestment.
2   
  While the above literature has generated some useful insights about firm boundaries, it 
has some shortcomings.
3  Two that seem particularly important to us are the following.  First, the 
emphasis on noncontractible ex ante investments seems overplayed: although such investments 
are surely important, it is hard to believe that they are the sole drivers of organizational form.  
Second, and related, the approach is ill-suited for studying the internal organization of firms, a 
topic of great interest and importance.  The reason is that the Coasian renegotiation perspective 
suggests that the relevant parties will sit down together ex post and bargain to an efficient 
outcome using side payments:  given this, it is hard to see why authority, hierarchy, delegation, 
or indeed anything apart from asset ownership matters. 
  We believe that in order to develop more general and compelling theories of 
organizational form it is essential to depart from a world in which Coasian renegotiation always 
leads to ex post efficiency.
4  The purpose of our paper is to move in this direction.  To achieve 
this goal we depart from the existing literature in two key ways.  First, we drop the assumption 
made in almost all of the literature that ex post trade is perfectly contractible.  Instead we 
suppose that trade is only partially contractible.
5  Specifically, we distinguish between 
perfunctory performance and consummate performance, or performance within the letter of the  
contract and performance within the spirit of the contract.
 6  Perfunctory performance can be 
                                                           
2 See, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
3 For a discussion, see Holmstrom (1999). 
4 One obvious possibility is to introduce asymmetric information.  To date such an approach has not been very 
fruitful in the theory of the firm.  But see Matouschek (2004). 
5 We do not go as far as some of the recent incomplete contracting literature that supposes that ex post trade is not 
contractible at all (see, e.g., Baker et al. (2006)). 
6 The perfunctory and consummate language is taken from Williamson (1975, p. 69).   
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judicially enforced, while consummate performance cannot.
7  Second, we introduce some 
important behavioral elements.  We suppose that a party is happy to provide consummate 
performance if he feels that he is getting what he is entitled to, but will withhold some part of 
consummate performance if he is shortchanged—we refer to this as “shading.”  An important 
assumption we will make (for most of the paper) is that a party’s sense of entitlement is 
determined by the contract he has written.  A companion assumption, also significant, is that the 
contract in question is negotiated under relatively competitive conditions.  A final element of the 
story is that there is no reason why parties’ feelings of entitlement should be consistent.  In 
particular, when the contract permits more than one outcome, each party may feel entitled to a 
different outcome.   
  These ingredients yield the above-described trade-off between flexibility and rigidity.  A 
flexible contract has the advantage that parties can adjust the outcome to the state of the world, 
but the disadvantage that any outcome selected will cause at least one party to feel aggrieved and 
shortchanged, which leads to a loss of surplus from shading.  An optimal contract trades off these 
two effects.  Our theory explains not only why parties will write somewhat rigid contracts, but 
also the nature of the rigidity.  The parties are more likely to put restrictions on variables over 
which there is an extreme conflict of interest, such as price, than on variables over which there is 
some alignment of interest, such as the nature or characteristics of the good to be traded.  Among 
other things, our model shows why simple employment contracts, which fix price (wage) in 
advance and allow the employer to choose the task, may be optimal.  More generally, the model 
explains why the wage should vary with the task if some tasks are systematically costlier than 
others. 
                                                           
7 For a discussion and examples, see Goldberg and Erickson (1987, p. 388). 4 
  For most of the paper we suppose that parties’ feelings of entitlement are controlled 
entirely by the contract they have written.  In reality other influences on entitlements are 
sometimes important.  For example, parties may look to related transactions to determine 
whether they are being fairly treated.  This consideration allows for a rich new set of 
possibilities; we examine these briefly in Section 5.  Although our analysis is preliminary, we 
show that external measures of entitlement can interfere with an ex ante contract, and that it may 
therefore be optimal for the parties to postpone contracting, i.e., the optimal ex ante contract may 
be “no contract.” 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model and discusses the two 
key assumptions of partial contractibility and shading.  In Section 3 we analyze a case where 
there is uncertainty about value and cost but not about the type of good to be traded.  In Section 4 
we consider a second case where there is uncertainty about the nature of the good.  Section 5 
allows for the possibility of influences on entitlements other than the initial contract.  In Section 
6 we discuss renegotiation.  Finally, Section 7 concludes.  The Appendix considers a more 
general class of contracts than those studied in the text and includes proofs of theorems. 
 
2.  The Model 
  We consider a buyer B and a seller S who are engaged in a long-term relationship.  The 
parties meet at date 0 and can trade at date 1.  We assume a perfectly competitive market for 
buyers and sellers at date 0, but that competition is much reduced at date 1:  in fact, for the most 
part we suppose that B and S face bilateral monopoly at date 1.  In other words, there is a 
“fundamental transformation” in the sense of Williamson (1985). 5 
  We do not model why this fundamental transformation occurs.  It could be because the 
parties make relationship-specific investments, but there may be other more prosaic reasons.  For 
example, imagine that B is organizing a wedding for his daughter.  S might be a caterer.  Six 
months before the wedding, say, there may be many caterers that B can approach and many 
weddings that S can cater.  But it may be very hard for B or S to find alternative partners a week 
before the wedding.  While there are no very obvious relationship-specific investments here, the 
fundamental transformation seems realistic, and the model applies. 
  It would be easy to fit relationship-specific investments explicitly into the analysis, but 
we would then suppose that these investments are contractible.  That is, an important feature of 
our model is that it does not rely on noncontractible investments. 
  We make some standard assumptions.  Any uncertainty at date 0 is resolved at date 1.  
There is symmetric information throughout, and the parties are risk neutral and face no wealth 
constraints. 
  We now come to the two assumptions that represent significant departures from the 
literature.  First we suppose that ex post trade is only partially contractible.  Specifically, while 
the broad outlines of ex post trade are contractible, the finer points are not.  As noted in the 
Introduction, we distinguish between perfunctory and consummate performance, or performance 
within the letter of the contract and performance within the spirit of the contract.   Perfunctory 
performance is enforceable by a court while consummate performance can never be judicially 
enforced. 
  For instance, in the wedding example, a judge can determine whether food was provided, 
but not the quality of the cake or whether the catering staff was friendly to the guests. 6 
  Before we describe our second (set of) assumption(s), it is useful to provide a time line; 
see Figure 1.  The parties meet and contract at date 0.  At this stage there may be uncertainty and 
so the parties typically choose to write a flexible contract that admits several outcomes.  At date 
1 the uncertainty is resolved and the parties refine the contract, that is, they decide which 
outcome to pick.  After this, trade occurs and the degree of consummate performance is 
determined.
8 
 
  0            1  
  │_______________________________________________│ 
 Parties  meet  and       Contract  refined  after 
 contract.        resolution  of  uncertainty. 
         Trade  occurs  and  degree  of   
         consummate  performance   
         d e t e r m i n e d .  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
  We now come to our second key departure from the literature.  We make a number of 
assumptions -- some behavioral -- about the determinants of consummate performance.  First, we 
suppose that consummate performance does not cost significantly more than perfunctory 
performance: either it costs slightly more or it may even cost slightly less, that is, a party may 
actually enjoy providing consummate performance.  Either way, a party is roughly indifferent 
between providing consummate and perfunctory performance. 
  Given this approximate indifference we take the view that a party will be willing to 
provide consummate performance if he is “well treated,” but not if he is “badly treated.”  The 
                                                           
8 Since a court can determine whether trade took place, any payments that B has promised S conditional on trade 
must be made: if not, S would sue for breach of contract.  In other words, payments are part of perfunctory 
performance. 7 
idea is that either consummate performance is costly but a party is naturally (slightly) altruistic, 
and is prepared to incur the cost if he is well treated; or that consummate performance is 
pleasurable, but a party is willing to forego this pleasure to punish a partner who did not treat 
him generously.
9 
  We make the crucial assumption that a party is “well treated” if and only if he receives 
what he is entitled to; and that the date 0 contract acts as a reference point for entitlements.  In 
fact, for most of the paper we suppose that the contract is the sole reference point for 
entitlements (but see Section 5).  What we mean by this is that a party does not feel entitled to 
more than the best outcome permitted by the contract.  So, for example, if the date 0 contract 
specifies just one outcome, then each party will feel that he is getting exactly what he is entitled 
to if that outcome occurs.
10  We discuss the assumption that the contract acts as a reference point 
further below.  As we shall make clear, this assumption is linked to a companion assumption that 
the contract is negotiated under relatively competitive conditions.
11 
                                                           
9 This idea is consistent with the large behavioral economics literature that has examined altruism, reciprocity, and 
retaliation.  For example, in the ultimatum game (see, e.g., Guth et al. (1982)), a suggested split of surplus by the 
proposer that  is seen as “greedy” will often elicit retaliation in the form of rejection by the responder, even though 
this is costly for the responder.  See Camerer and Thaler (1995) for a discussion, and Andreoni et al. (2003) for 
experimental evidence for the case where the responder can scale back the level of trade rather than rejecting trade 
entirely.  Other important works on reciprocity and retaliation include Akerlof (1982), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Rabin (1993), Fehr et al. (1997), and Bewley (1999); for surveys see Fehr and Gachter 
(2000) and Sobel (2005).  MacLeod (2003) models the role of retaliation in sustaining accurate assessments of 
worker performance.  Direct empirical evidence of retaliation by employees or contractors in response to “bad 
treatment,” in the form of poor performance, negligence, or sabotage, can be found in Lord and Hohenfeld (1979), 
Giacalone and Greenberg (1997), Greenberg (1990), Krueger and Mas (2004), and Mas (2006). 
10 Note that the experimental evidence of Falk et al. (2003) is consistent with the idea that whether a person feels 
well treated depends not only on the outcome that occurs but also on what other outcomes were available (see also 
Camerer and Thaler (1995)). 
11 The notion of a reference point has played an important role in the recent behavioral economics literature, 
including that concerned with contractual relationships.  Kahneman et al. (1986) provide evidence that for 
transactions between firms and consumers customers use past prices as a reference point for judging the fairness of a 
transaction.  See also Okun (1981), Falk et al. (2006), Frey (1997, Chapter 2), and Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) for 
related ideas.  Akerlof and Yellen (1990) consider the importance of reference groups in the determination of a fair 
wage.  Benjamin (2006) analyzes the implications of reference points for optimal incentive schemes, and 
Carmichael and MacLeod (2003) for the hold-up problem.  Our paper owes a lot to the above literature, but differs 
from it in supposing that a contract governing a transaction is a reference point for the transaction itself. 
 8 
  Matters become more complicated if the contract specifies more than one outcome.  Now 
we take the view that the parties may no longer agree about what they are entitled to.  In 
particular, if the contract says that either outcome a or outcome b can occur, then one party may 
feel entitled to a and the other to b.  We do not model why these differences in entitlements arise, 
but we have in mind the kinds of effects described in the self-serving bias literature.
12  For 
example, each party may feel that he has taken an action between dates 0 and 1 that has 
contributed to the trading opportunity available at date 1, and that he deserves to be rewarded for 
this.  Virtue is in the eye of the beholder and so each party may exaggerate his own contribution.  
To capture conflict as simply as possible we suppose that each party feels entitled to the best 
outcome permitted by the contract.  However, our analysis does not depend on such an extreme 
view of entitlements.
13  Obviously, opening the black box of entitlements and self-serving biases 
is an important topic for future research.
14 
  The final piece of the story is that getting less than what you are entitled to causes 
aggrievement and leads to retaliation and “shading.”  Specifically, for each dollar that a party is 
shortchanged he shades his performance so that the other party’s payoff falls by $θ, where 0 < θ 
≤ 1.  We take θ to be exogenous – it represents both the desire and opportunity for retaliation (θ 
might reflect the probability that a retaliation opportunity arises) – but in future work it would be 
interesting to endogenize it.   
                                                           
12 See, e.g., Hastorf and Cantril (1954), Messick and Sentis (1979), Ross and Sicoly (1979), and Babcock et al. 
(1995).  For discussions, see Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) and Bazerman (1998, pp 94-101). 
13 For example, suppose that the parties’ feelings of entitlement are stochastic: with some probability the parties’ 
entitlements sum to more than the total surplus available from the contract, and with some probability to less.  Then 
the model goes through as long as parties who receive more than their entitlements do not “over-provide” 
consummate performance to the point that this makes up for the perfunctory performance that they provide when 
they receive less than their entitlements.  For some experimental evidence consistent with the idea that an increase in 
performance from receiving a dollar more than one’s entitlement is less than the decrease in performance from 
receiving a dollar less, see Charness and Rabin (2002) and Offerman (2002).  Note that conflicting notions of 
entitlement may also arise because of differences in information about the total surplus available.  See Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2005). 
14 See Rabin (1995) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) for interesting efforts to model self-serving biases. 
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  Shading decisions are made simultaneously by B and S, and are not observable to an 
outsider.  Hence they are not contractible, even at date 1 (recall our assumption that consummate 
performance can never be enforced judicially).  Shading decisions are, however, anticipated by 
both parties, i.e., the parties have rational expectations.  Finally, we suppose that shading is 
infeasible if the parties do not trade at date 1 (trade can be shaded but no trade cannot be shaded). 
  It is worth saying a bit more about the nature of shading.  There are many ways one 
trading partner can hurt another.  For example, a seller can shade by cutting quality, e.g., in the 
wedding example, she can stint on some of the ingredients of the wedding cake (more colorfully, 
she can spit in the soup).  Another example is withholding cooperation.  The buyer may want the 
seller to turn up half an hour early.  The cost to the seller may be low, and she would normally 
oblige.  But if the seller feels aggrieved she may refuse this request at considerable cost to the 
buyer.  A third example would be “working to rule”:  the seller abides by the strict terms of the 
contract and offers no more.
15 
  Shading is not confined to a seller.  While it is harder to imagine a buyer cutting back on 
quality, it is easy to think of situations where a buyer refuses to make minor concessions or to 
cooperate (for example, the buyer may turn down the seller’s request to come half an hour later).  
The buyer can also make life difficult for the seller by quibbling about details of performance.  
Thus, while the assumption that B and S can shade symmetrically and face the same parameter θ 
is strong, we view it as a natural starting point for our analysis.  In Section 7 we discuss 
alternative interpretations and extensions of the model for the case where shading is asymmetric. 
                                                           
15 For further discussion and examples of seller shading, see Goldberg and Erickson (1987, p. 388), Lord and 
Hohenfeld (1979), Giacalone and Greenberg (1997), Greenberg (1990), Krueger and Mas (2004), and Mas (2006).   
One approach to solving the problem of seller shading is for the buyer to withhold some part of his payment until 
after the transaction is complete, i.e., to offer a bonus or tip to the seller for consummate performance.  Such a 
solution is more likely to work in a repeated relationship than in the one-shot exchange studied here; in a one-shot 
situation the buyer would have an incentive to claim that the performance wasn’t consummate even if it was 
(another possibility is that the buyer, fearing the seller’s wrath, would pay the bonus regardless of the quality of 
performance).  For a more positive view of the effectiveness of bonus schemes, see Scott (2003). 10 
  In sum we appeal to three key ideas from the behavioral literature: reference points and 
entitlements, self-serving biases, and reciprocity and retaliation. 
  At this point, it is useful to illustrate the model with a simple example.  Suppose that B 
requires one unit of a standard good – a widget – from S at date 1.  Assume that it is known at 
date 0 that B’s value is 100 and S’s cost is zero: there is no uncertainty.  What is the optimal 
contract? 
  The answer found in the standard literature is that, in this setting without noncontractible 
investments, no ex ante contract is necessary: the parties can wait until date 1 to contract.  To 
review the argument, imagine that the parties do wait until date 1.  Assume that Nash bargaining 
occurs and they divide the surplus 50 : 50, i.e., the price p = 50.  Of course, a  
50 : 50 division may not represent the competitive conditions at date 0.  For simplicity, suppose 
that there is one buyer and many sellers at date 0, so that in competitive equilibrium B receives 
all the surplus.  Then S will make a lump-sum payment of 50 to B at date 0: in effect S pays B up 
front for the privilege of being able to hold B up once the parties are in a situation of bilateral 
monopoly. 
  This “no contract” solution, combined with a lump-sum payment, no longer works in our 
context.  To see why, suppose for the moment that “no contract” means that trade can occur at 
any price between zero and 100 (we revisit this assumption in Section 5).  (Prices above 100 are 
irrelevant since B will reject the widget and prices below zero are irrelevant since S will refuse to 
supply.)  But this means that when the parties reach date 1 there is much to argue about.
16  The 
best contractual outcome possible for B is a zero price and our assumption is that he will feel 
                                                           
16 If B’s value of 100 and S’s cost of zero were objective (i.e., verifiable), the parties might well agree that the fair 
outcome is to split the difference and set p = 50.  We have in mind a more complex situation, where, because value 
and cost are observable but not verifiable, there is some flexibility in how the parties interpret these variables; this 
opens the door to conflict.  While we do not formalize this notion of flexibility or fuzziness, it would clearly be 
desirable to do so in the future. 11 
entitled to it; and the best contractual outcome possible for S is a price of 100 and our 
assumption is that she will feel entitled to it.  In spite of these conflicting feelings of entitlement, 
the parties will settle on some price p between 0 and 100, and trade will occur.  However, each 
party will feel aggrieved and will shade.  Since B feels shortchanged by p, he shades by θp, and 
since S feels shortchanged by (100 – p), she shades by θ(100 – p).  Thus the final payoffs are 
 
(2.1) UB = 100 – p – θ(100 – p) = (1 – θ)(100 – p), 
 
(2.2) US = p – θp = (1 – θ)p, 
 
and total surplus is given by 
 
(2.3)  W = (1 – θ)100. 
 
  We see that, independent of p, there is a loss of 100 θ.
17 
  What can be done to eliminate this  loss?  The first point to note is that ex post Coasian 
renegotiation at date 1 does not do the job.  The reason is that shading is not contractible, and 
thus a contract not to shade is not enforceable.  To put it another way, if B offers to pay S more 
not to shade, then while this will indeed reduce S’s shading since S will feel less aggrieved, it 
will increase B’s shading because B will feel more aggrieved!  In fact, it is clear from (2.3) that 
changes in p do not affect aggregate shading, which is given by 100 θ. 
                                                           
17 Note the role of the assumption that 0 < θ ≤ 1.  If θ > 1, the shading costs are so large that the parties will not trade 
at all at date 1 in the absence of a date 0 contract.  Although we rule out the case θ > 1, this does not mean that it is 
uninteresting. 12 
  Note that the conclusion that the  loss from shading equals 100 θ remains true even if the 
parties replace renegotiation at date 1 by a mechanism.  For example, suppose B and S agree at 
date 0 that B will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S at date 1.  The best offer for B to make is p 
= 0.  However, S will feel that B could and should have offered p = 100 since S is entitled to this.  
Thus S will be aggrieved by 100, and will shade by 100 θ.  Hence the  loss from shading is again 
100 θ.   
  Although these approaches do not work, there is a very simple solution to the shading 
problem.  The parties can write a contract at date 0 that fixes p at some level between 0 and 100, 
e.g., if there are many sellers and only one buyer at date 0, then it would be natural to set p = 0.  
Then there is nothing to argue about at date 1.  Neither party will feel aggrieved or shortchanged 
since each receives exactly what he or she bargained for and expected.  Hence no shading occurs 
and total surplus equals 100.
18 
  As we have argued earlier, a contract that fixes price works because it anchors the 
parties’ expectations and feelings of entitlement: the contract is a reference point.  An obvious 
question to ask is, what changes between dates 0 and 1?  Why does a date 0 contract that fixes p 
= 0 avoid aggrievement by S, whereas a date 1 contract that fixes p = 0 does not?  Our view is 
that the ex ante market plays a crucial role here.  Since the date 0 market is more competitive 
than the date 1 market – for simplicity we have supposed that the date 0 market is perfectly 
competitive while the date 1 market is perfectly noncompetitive – it provides an external, i.e., 
objective, measure of what B and S bring to the relationship.  S accepts that p = 0 is a reasonable 
price for the transaction because there are many other (identical) suppliers at date 0 who are 
                                                           
18Note that we are ignoring “efficiency wage” considerations in our analysis.  Regardless of date 0 market 
conditions, B might well feel that it makes sense to offer S a price in excess of cost in order to encourage better 
performance (see, e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).  However, note that efficiency wage ideas are not inconsistent 
with our approach.  Our view is that, whatever the level of the price, it still makes sense for B and S to fix price in 
advance in order to avoid argument about the right price later. 13 
prepared to supply at this price.  Our assumption is that B and S continue to accept the external 
measures provided by the date 0 market, now embodied in their contract, once their relationship 
is underway.
19  In contrast, if B and S pass up the opportunity to write a contract at date 0, then 
by the time date 1 arrives there are no external measures to control entitlements, and the result 
will be argument, aggrievement, and shading.
20 
  The example analyzed in this section is very special because a date 0 contract that fixes 
price achieves the first-best.  The first-best is no longer achievable if either (a) v, c are uncertain; 
or (b) the nature of the good (the widget) is uncertain.  We study case (a) in Section 3 and case 
(b) in Section 4. 
 
3.  The Case Where Value and Cost Are Uncertain 
  In this section we consider the case where B wants one unit of a standard good – a widget 
– from S at date 1 but there is uncertainty about B’s value v and S’s cost c.  This uncertainty is 
resolved at date 1.  There is symmetric information throughout, so that v, c are observable to 
both parties.  However, v, c are not verifiable, and so state-contingent contracts cannot be 
written. 
  We make an important simplifying assumption.  We suppose that trade occurs at date 1 if 
and only if both parties want it, i.e., trade is voluntary.  To put it another way, if no trade occurs 
an outsider (e.g., a judge) cannot tell whether this is because the seller refused to supply the 
                                                           
19 To the extent that the role of the contract is to embody and anchor entitlements, the fact that the contract is legally 
binding is perhaps of secondary importance.  Much of our analysis goes through if the contract is viewed as a non-
binding agreement.  See in particular the discussion of agreements to agree in Section 3.  Note, however, that legal 
enforcement may be important in ensuring perfunctory performance, including that B pays S for goods or services 
received at date 1. 
20 To emphasize this point, suppose that B and S are in a situation of bilateral monopoly already at date 0, i.e., the 
date 0 market is no more competitive than the date 1 market.  Then, if they agree on p = 50, say, at date 0, our view 
is that each will be aggrieved by 50 and this aggrievement will carry over to date 1 and lead to shading. 14 
widget or the buyer refused to accept it.
21  As a result, a party cannot be punished for breach of 
contract.  We are confident that the main ideas of this section generalize to the case where 
specific performance is possible, but the details become more complicated. 
  Note that the model can also be interpreted as applying to the case where the parties write 
an “agreement to agree” at date 0.
22  That is, suppose that the parties intend to use the date 0 
agreement as a framework for future negotiation (this corresponds to the refinement process in 
Figure 1), but for some reason are not yet ready to sign a binding contract.  The usual legal 
presumption is that either party can opt out of such an agreement if future negotiations fail.
23  
Thus the voluntary trade assumption holds. 
  In this setting the simplest kind of contract consists of a no-trade price p0 and a trade price 
p1.  Given the voluntary trade assumption, trade will occur (q = 1) if and only if 
 
(3.1) v  ≥ p1 - p0 ≥ c. 
 
From (3.1) it is clear that only the difference between p1 and p0 matters, and so, given the 
existence of lump-sum transfers, we can normalize p0 to be zero.
24   
 
 
  It is worth comparing (3.1) to the first-best trading rule, given by 
 
(3.2)  q = 1 Ù v ≥ c. 
                                                           
21 This assumption is taken from Hart and Moore (1988). 
22See, e.g., Corbin (1993, Chapter 2.8) and Farnsworth (1999, pp. 207-222).  
23 See, e.g., Corbin (1993, Chapters 2 and 4) and Farnsworth (1999, pp. 207-222). 
24 Of course, under the agreement-to-agree interpretation, p0 is necessarily zero. 15 
 
  We need to deal with one further issue before we proceed.  After the uncertainty about v, 
c is resolved, suppose v > c but either v < p1 - p0 or c > p1 - p0.  At this stage, the parties might 
want to renegotiate their contract.  Renegotiation does not fundamentally change our results and 
so, for the moment, we ignore it; we return to it in Section 6. 
  Since we want to allow for contractual flexibility we shall wish to generalize beyond 
simple contracts.  One way to introduce flexibility is to suppose that the contract specifies a no-
trade price p0 and an interval of trading prices [p, p].  Suppose for simplicity that B chooses the 
trade price at date 1.  Then 
 
 (3.3)  q = 1 Ù ∃  p ≤ p1 ≤  p s.t. v ≥ p1 - p0 ≥ c. 
 
In other words, trade occurs if and only if B can find a price in the range [p, p]   so that the 
parties want to trade (B will choose the lowest such price).  Actually, it is clear that the same 
trading rule (3.3) holds if S chooses p1 (S will choose the highest price in the range [p, p]  that 
guarantees trade); moreover, the level of shading will be the same given that the parties have the 
same θ.  This feature – that the mechanism for choosing the outcome doesn’t matter – is special 
to the model of this section: it will importantly not hold in the model of Section 4. 
  It follows from (3.3) that, again, only the difference between p1 and p0 matters, and so we 
can normalize p0 ≡ 0 and rewrite (3.3) as  
 
(3.4)  q = 1 Ù ∃  p ≤ p ≤  ps.t. v ≥ p  ≥ c 
  Ù  v ≥ c, v ≥ p, c ≤ p. 16 
 
  More general contracts than p0 ≡ 0, pε [p, p] are in fact possible.   For example, a 
contract could permit p to lie in some set other than an interval, or it could allow p0 and p1 both to 
vary.  In the Appendix we show that our main ideas extend to the case where a contract consists 
of an arbitrary set of (p0,  p1) pairs and a mechanism – a game – for choosing among them.  In 
order to carry out this generalization, we need to refine slightly our assumptions about the 
determinants of a party’s aggrievement level. 
  Given a contract [p,p] (that is, p0 ≡ 0, pε [p, p]), what determines aggrievement?  Our 
hypothesis is that each party feels entitled to the best outcome permitted by the contract.  
However, each party also recognizes that, given the voluntary trade assumption, he or she cannot 
hope to obtain more than one hundred percent of the gains from trade.  This means that S feels 
entitled to p = Min (v, p) and B feels entitled to p = Max (c, p).  (Another way to think about it 
is that if S had complete control over the price but had to stick within the contract she would 
choose p = Min (v,p), and if B had complete control over the price but had to stick within the 
contract he would choose p = Max (c, p).)  Thus aggregate aggrievement equals {Min (v,p) – 
Max (c, p)}.  An optimal contract maximizes expected surplus net of shading costs.  (Lump-sum 
transfers are used to reallocate surplus.)  Thus an optimal contract solves: 
 
(3.5)   Max
p,p
    [v - c - {Min(v, p
vc
vp
cp
θ
≥
≥
≤
∫ ) - Max(c,p)}]dF(v,c), 
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where F is the distribution function of (v, c). 
  The trade-off is clear.  A large interval [p, p] makes it more likely that trade will occur if  
v ≥ c.  (If p = -∞, p= ∞, the trading rule becomes the first-best one: q = 1 Ù v ≥ c.)  However, it 
also increases expected shading costs. 
  We refer to a contract where p = pas a simple contract, and a contract where p < p as a 
non-simple contract.  We start off with some cases where the first-best is achievable with a 
simple contract. 
 
Proposition 3.1.  A simple contract achieves the first-best if (i) onlyv ~ varies; (ii) only  c ~  
varies; (iii) the smallest element of the support of v ~ is at least as great as the largest element of 
the support of  c ~ . 
 
  The proof of Proposition 3.1 is immediate.  If only v ~ varies, choose a simple contract 
with p = c.  If only  c ~ varies, choose a simple contract with p = v.  If (iii) holds, choose a simple 
contract with p between the smallest v and largest c. 
  In some cases one needs a non-simple contract to achieve the first-best. 
 
Example 3.1 
  Suppose that there are two states of the world.  In s1, v =9, c = 0.  In s2, v = 20, c = 10.  
In other words, either v and c are both low or they are both high. 
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    s 1    s2 
  v     9   20 
  c     0   10 
 
  Obviously, one cannot get the first-best with a simple contract since there is no price p 
that lies both between 0 and 9 and between 10 and 20.  However, a contract that specifies an 
interval of trading prices [9,10] (p = 9, p= 10), with B choosing the price, does achieve the first-
best.  To see why, note that in s1 B will choose p = 9 since this is the lowest available price.  S 
will not be aggrieved since, even if S could choose the price, she would not pick a price above 9 
given that this would cause B not to trade.  In s2 B picks p = 10 since this is the lowest price 
consistent with S being willing to trade.  S is again not aggrieved since she couldn’t hope for a 
higher price than 10 given that 10 is the highest available price.  Thus, the contract p = 9, p= 10 
achieves trade in both states without any shading. 
  Note that in this example the optimal contract is unique.  Any price range smaller than 
[9,10] would fail to generate trade in one of the states, and any price range larger than [9,10] 
would cause aggrievement in at least one of the states.  (If p < 9, the parties would argue about 
where p should be in the range [p,9] in s1, and if p > 10, the parties would argue about where p 
should be in the range [10,p] in s2.) 
  We now turn to an example where the first-best cannot be achieved even with a non-
simple contract. 
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Example 3.2 
  The example is the same as the previous one except that there is a third state, s3, where v 
is high and c is low. 
 
    s 1    s2   s3 
  v     9   20   20 
  c     0   10       0 
 
  The first-best cannot be achieved because, in order to ensure trade in s1, s2, we need  
p ≤ 9, p≥ 10.  But such a price range leads to aggrievement and shading in s3. 
  There are three possible candidates for a second-best optimal contract: 
 
(a)  p = p= 9. 
 
This contract yields trade in s1 and s3 but not in s2.  Since there is nothing to argue about – the 
price is fixed at 9 -- there is no shading.  Total surplus is given by 
 
  W a = 9 π1 + 20 π3 , 
 
where π1, π3  are the probabilities of s1, s3, respectively. 
 
 
 
(b) p = p= 10. 
 20 
This contract yields trade in s2 and s3 but not in s1.  Since there is nothing to argue about – the 
price is fixed at 10 -- there is no shading.  Total surplus is given by  
 
  W b = 10 π2 + 20 π3,  
 
where π2 is the probability of s2. 
 
(c) p = 9, p= 10. 
 
This contract yields trade in all three states, but there is aggregate aggrievement of 1 in s3.  Total 
surplus is given by 
 
  W c = 9 π1 + 10 π2 + (20 – θ) π3. 
 
  Obviously, which of these contracts is optimal depends on the probabilities π1, π2, π3 and 
θ.  Contract (a) is optimal if π2 is small, contract (b) is optimal if π1 is small, and contract (c) is 
optimal if π3 or θ is small. 
  Two observations can be made about this example.  First, if third parties are permitted, 
the first-best can be achieved.  Consider a contract that fixes the trade price and makes both B 
and S pay a large amount to a third party in the absence of trade (i.e., the no-trade price is large 
and positive for B and large and negative for S).  This leads to trade in all states, and no 
aggrievement, since the consequences of not trading are dire.  However, this arrangement works 
only because trade is efficient in every state.  In a more general example where trade is efficient 21 
in some states but not others, third parties do not guarantee the first-best.  In what follows we 
ignore third parties. 
  Second, the reader may wonder whether “Maskin mechanisms” could improve matters.
25  
Maskin mechanisms are a way of making observable information verifiable.  Note that if the 
state were verifiable, it would be easy to achieve the first-best.  For example, a contract that 
specifies p = 9 in s1 and s3, and p = 10 in s2 would do the job.  Call this contract (d). 
  However, Maskin mechanisms do not work in our situation.  A Maskin mechanism is a 
subtle version of the following.  Each party reports the state of the world.  If they agree the price 
is as in contract (d), say.  If they disagree something unpleasant happens.  The problem is that in 
s3 S would like B to play the Maskin mechanism as if it were s2 and will be aggrieved by 1 if B 
refuses to go along with this.  On the other hand B will be aggrieved by 1 if S refuses to play the 
mechanism as if it were s3.  Either way aggregate aggrievement in s3 is 1, which yields total 
surplus equal to Wc, as in contract (c).   
  It may be useful to talk more generally about state contingency (or, more accurately, lack 
of state contingency).  Why can’t agreements between two parties who will both learn the state 
of the world be made state contingent?  In principle, one could imagine B and S having the 
following conversation at date 0 about contract (c).  B could tell S that he will pay 9 at date 1 in 
all circumstances unless S will not trade at this price; in which case B will raise the price to 10.  
B could explain to S that she should not feel aggrieved in s3 when B does not raise the price to 
10 since the very fact that S trades in this state shows that B is right about S’s cost: B does not 
need to raise the price to get S to trade.  In other words, B will do exactly what he said he would 
do, and there is no reason for S to feel angry about it.  (To put it a little more formally, a contract 
                                                           
25 See Maskin (1999). 
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that makes price a function of an observable but unverifiable state of the world should not cause 
aggrievement since both parties observe the state and can see whether the other party is sticking 
to the contract.) 
  In our opinion the problem with this argument is the following.  Between dates 0 and 1 S 
may undertake some (unmodeled) actions that she feels have contributed to B’s payoff.  She 
feels entitled to be rewarded for these actions.  (Here we appeal to self-serving biases concerning 
the magnitude of these actions.)  Whatever speech B has made at date 0, B has the option, if he 
so chooses, to raise the price to 10, i.e., this is consistent with the contract.  In other words, B can 
pretend that S’s cost is 10 even if it isn’t.  If B refuses to recognize S’s contributions and offers 
only 9, S will take this to be an ungenerous act and will respond by shading.
26   
  This brings to a close our discussion of the case where parties induce flexibility by 
specifying a price range.  It is not clear how common this case is.  One reason is that in practice 
the parties may be able to ensure trade when v and c vary through specific performance.  Note, 
however, that price ranges are observed in the case of agreements to agree.
27  In any event, we 
see the model of this section as something of a five-finger exercise.  In the next section we 
consider a model where the uncertainty concerns the nature of the good to be provided.  We will 
show that this model can shed light on the employment relationship. 
 
4.  The Case Where the Nature of the Good is Uncertain 
  In this section we consider the case where there is uncertainty about the nature of the 
good or service B requires from S.  For example, S might provide secretarial services for B, and 
                                                           
26 Of course, even if the contract specifies that p = 9 always, as in contract (a), B could in principle unilaterally raise 
the price to 10 at date 1 to recognize S’s efforts.  But this would be an act of charity; our assumption is that S does 
not expect this and is not disappointed when it does not occur. 
27 See, e.g., Corbin (1993, Chapter 4.3), Ben-Shahar (2004, pp. 424-425). 23 
B may not know in advance whether he wants S to type letters or file papers.  We will actually 
use a more colorful example.  We will suppose that B is arranging an evening with friends and 
wants S to perform music.  The nature of the music may depend on eventualities that will occur 
between dates 0 and 1, e.g., who is coming to the evening, what music S is rehearsing for other 
performances, etc. 
  To make matters as simple as possible, we will assume that there are two types of 
music/composers that it might be efficient for S to play: Bach and Shostakovich.  In the 
Appendix we also allow for convex combinations of Bach and Shostakovich, but in the text we 
will not need to do this.  Each composer can take on one of two value-cost combinations, given 
by (v, c) and (v – Δ, c – δ), respectively, where v > v – Δ > c > c – δ.  (Everything is measured in 
money terms.)  In other words a composer can be “high value-high cost” or “low value-low 
cost.”  We do not insist on stochastic independence of the two value-cost combinations, but we 
do impose symmetry, i.e., the probability that Bach is “high value-high cost” and Shostakovich is 
“low value-low cost” is the same as the probability of the reverse.  Thus, there are four states of 
the world: 
 
  s1  (Prob  π1)      s2 (Prob (1- π1- π4)/2)    s3 (Prob (1- π1- π4)/2)       s4 (Prob π4)   
Bach           (v,c)             (v,c)                          (v-Δ,c-δ)                      (v-Δ,c-δ) 
Shostakovich         (v,c)          (v-Δ,c-δ)                             (v,c)                          (v-Δ,c-δ) 
 
Figure 2 
 
  We start with the case Δ > δ.  This implies that the high value-high cost composer yields 
more surplus than the low value-low cost composer and should be chosen whenever available.  24 
Thus the first-best has any music in states s1 and s4, Bach in s2, and Shostakovich in s3.  
Expected total surplus is W = v – c – π4
 (Δ – δ). 
  What is the optimal second-best contract given that the state is observable but not 
verifiable?  We continue to assume voluntary trade and set p0 ≡ 0.  We also focus on contracts 
that deliver symmetric outcomes, i.e., whatever composer occurs in s2, the “mirror image” 
composer occurs in s3, and the prices are the same in the two states. 
  It will simplify the presentation to start with the case π1 =  π4 = 0, i.e., where s2 and s3 
each occur with probability ½.  We will see that this case is actually too simple, but it is useful 
for building up intuition.   
  There are four natural candidates for an optimal contract:  no contract, a contract that 
fixes price and lets B choose the composer, a contract that fixes price and lets S choose the 
composer, and a contract that fixes price and composer.  We consider these in turn. 
 
(a)  No contract 
The parties can always wait until date 1 to contract, by which time they will know whether s2 or 
s3 has occurred.  They will then bargain over the division of surplus, v – c.  The analysis is 
similar to that in Section 2: whatever price between c and v is agreed to, the total amount of 
aggrievement will be (v – c), and so shading costs will be θ(v – c).  Hence net surplus is 
 
 W a = (1 - θ) (v – c). 
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(b)  A contract that fixes the price p such that c ≤  p ≤ v - Δ and lets B choose the composer at 
date 1 
Given that price is fixed, B will choose the highest value composer at date 1: Bach in s2, 
Shostakovich in s3.  Since Δ > δ this is the efficient choice.  However, in each state the seller 
will be aggrieved that B did not choose her favorite composer: Shostakovich in s2, Bach in s3.  
The seller will be shortchanged by δ, the difference in the costs between the two composers, and 
so shading costs are θδ.  Total surplus is  
 
 W b  =  v – c – θδ. 
 
(c)  A contract that fixes the price p such that c ≤  p ≤ v – Δ and lets S choose the composer at 
date 1 
Given that price is fixed, S will be inclined to choose the lowest cost composer at date 1, which 
is inefficient.  B will be aggrieved by Δ, the difference in value between his favorite composer 
and S’s choice, and will shade so that S’s payoff falls by θΔ.  Note that if θΔ > δ, S will be worse 
off than if she had chosen the high cost composer, and so she will choose the high cost composer 
after all.  On the other hand, if θ Δ < δ, S will stick with the low cost choice, and surplus is 
 
 W c  =  v – Δ – c + δ – θΔ. 
 
(d)  A contract that fixes the price p such that c ≤  p ≤ v – Δ and fixes the composer 
Suppose the composer is fixed at Bach, say.  This yields the efficient choice of composer half the 
time, and so surplus is  26 
 
 W d  =  ½(v – c) + ½(v - Δ – c + δ) = v – c – ½ Δ + ½ δ. 
 
Note that there is no cost of shading in contract (d) since, with price and composer fixed, there is 
nothing to be aggrieved about. 
 
  How do contracts (a) – (d) compare?  Since v – Δ > c and Δ > δ, it is easy to see that Wb  
> Wa.  (If δ − ~  0, Wb − ~  v – c, i.e., contract (b) achieves approximately the first-best.)  Also it is 
clear that Wb  > Wc (in contract (c) the composer is less efficient than in (b) and there is more 
shading).  So the choice is between contracts (b) and (d).  Algebra tells us that (b) is better if and 
only if 
 
(4.1)   Δ  > (1 + 2θ) δ. 
 
  The analysis so far is a little misleading.  There is a contract that performs better than 
either (b) or (d), and in fact achieves the first-best.  This contract is a variation of (b), in which 
the constraint c ≤ p ≤ v – Δ is dropped.  Specifically, consider the contract in which the price p = 
v and B chooses the composer.  B will make the efficient choice in each state (as in contract (b)), 
but in addition S will not be aggrieved.  The reason is that B exactly breaks even: any composer 
who is more favorable to S than Bach in s2 and Shostakovich in s3 would cause B to refuse to 
trade, i.e., such a composer would violate B’s individual rationality constraint. 
  There is something very fragile about the contract just described.  If there is any chance 
that B’s value falls below v it will lead to no trade.  In the next proposition we return to the case 27 
where states s1 and s4 have positive probability.  The proposition tells us that, as long as π4 is not 
too low, fixing p close to v is a bad idea.  The proposition also requires π1 not to be too low in 
order to rule out subtle contracts that can also do better than (b) and (d).  In the Appendix we 
establish formally: 
 
Proposition 4.1  Assume v > v – Δ > c > c – δ, and Δ > δ.  Suppose in addition 
1
4
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.  Then the optimal second-
best contract fixes c ≤ p ≤ v – Δ.  In addition, if Δ > (1 + 2θ)δ, B is given the right to choose the 
composer, while, if Δ < (1 + 2θ)δ, the parties fix the composer, at Bach say. 
 
  Proposition 4.1 illuminates the different roles played by price and music in the model of 
this section.  Price has no allocative role – its choice is a zero sum game – and so, in order to 
avoid aggrievement, it is better to fix it in advance.  Music does serve an allocative role and so, if 
Δ/δ is large or θ is small, it makes sense to leave it open.  Moreover, if Δ/δ is large or θ is small, 
B should choose the composer since B will make an efficient choice, and, given that S cares 
relatively little, aggrievement will be low. 
  Note that there are two implicit assumptions underlying Proposition 4.1.  First, aggregate 
uncertainty is small (v – Δ > c), and so price does not have to vary across the four states in order 
to ensure that both parties wish to trade, as it did in Section 3.  Second, there is no systematic 
relationship between composer and cost.  In contrast, if Shostakovich, say, was on average 
costlier for S to play than Bach, then it would be optimal to have a higher price for Shostakovich 
than Bach, in order to reduce S’s aggrievement in states where Shostakovich is chosen.  In other 28 
words, a generalized version of the model can explain why price should vary with the service S 
provides if there are systematic differences in costs.
28 
  Let’s now turn to the case where Δ < δ, i.e., the low value-low cost composer yields more 
surplus than the high value-high cost composer.  The argument goes through as above except that 
now it is never optimal for B to choose the composer but it may be optimal for S to choose the 
composer:  Contract (c) may be optimal, but contract (b) is not.  We have 
 
Proposition 4.2  Assume v > v – Δ > c > c – δ, and Δ < δ.  Suppose in addition 
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second-best contract fixes c ≤ p ≤ v - Δ.  In addition, if δ > (1 + 2θ) Δ, S is given the right to 
choose the composer, while, if δ < (1 + 2θ) Δ, the parties fix the composer, at Bach say.   
 
  We believe that Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 can throw light on a classic question: the nature 
of the employment relationship and the difference between an employee and an independent 
contractor.  In early work, Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) argued that a key feature of the 
employment relationship is that an employer tells an employee what to do.  This view was 
challenged by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and the more recent literature has emphasized asset 
ownership as the distinguishing aspect of these relationships (see Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
                                                           
28 It is worth revisiting our assumptions about aggrievement and shading at this point.  Take contract (b), where 
price is fixed and B chooses the composer.  Why is S aggrieved in s2 or s3 when B chooses the high cost composer?  
In Sections 2 and 3 we offered one justification: S may feel that she has contributed to surplus and should be 
rewarded with the low cost composer.  Here we offer an alternative justification based on subjective views of 
valuation.  Suppose that the state is s2.  S can tell herself the following.  It’s true that B thinks that Bach is worth Δ 
more to him than Shostakovich, while the incremental cost to me is only δ, and B therefore feels justified in 
choosing Bach.  However, I, S, think that, even though B doesn’t realize this, the true value of Bach is close to v – 
Δ.  (Self-serving biases are behind this belief.)  Given this, I do not think that B’s request is reasonable, and if he 
insists on Bach, I will respond by shading on performance. 29 
Hart and Moore (1990)).
29  The current model allows us to return to the ideas of Coase and 
Simon.  We interpret the case where B chooses the composer as an employment relationship and 
the case where S chooses the composer as independent contracting.
30  That is, if B hires S’s 
musical services for the evening, with the understanding that B will tell S what to do, then S is 
working for B.  In contrast, if B engages S to provide an evening of music, with the details of 
exactly how this is to be done left up to S, then S is an independent contractor.
31 
  Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 tell us that when θ is small, if B cares more about the composer, 
that is, Δ > δ, then employment is better (if δ− ~ 0, an employment contract achieves 
approximately the first-best); while if S cares more about the composer, that is, Δ < δ, 
then independent contracting is better (if Δ − ~ 0, independent contracting achieves approximately 
the first-best).  In both cases it is optimal for the parties to fix the price in advance.   
  While these results are in the spirit of Coase and Simon, they differ from Simon’s formal 
argument in important ways.  Simon would also argue that B should choose the composer if B 
cares more about the composer than S.  However, in Simon’s model it is not clear why an ex ante 
contract is needed at all.  Since there is no aggrievement (not surprisingly!) and no 
noncontractible investments, the parties can rely on Coasian bargaining at date 1.  Also, a 
contract that achieves the first-best in Simon’s model is one where B has the right to make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to S; i.e., B proposes a price-composer pair, and S can accept or reject it.  
In other words, in Simon’s model there are many optimal contracts (a continuum, in fact), of 
which the employment contract is just one. 
                                                           
29 But see Wernerfelt (1997). 
30 This notion of independent contracting differs from Simon’s.  Simon views independent contracting as 
corresponding to the case where the price and composer are both fixed. 
31 The distinction between an employee and an independent contractor shouldn’t be taken too literally.  An 
independent contractor will sometimes do what a buyer tells her to, and an employee sometimes will not.  Still, in 
general terms the notion that an employee is subject to the authority of a boss whereas an independent contractor is 
not seems valid.  For a discussion, see, e.g., Coase (1937, p. 403-404). 30 
  We saw in Section 2 that this is not true in our model.  For example, consider the contract 
in which B offers a price-composer pair.  B will suggest price equal to cost, and there will be 
aggrievement and shading in all states since S will feel entitled to a higher price.  Thus this 
contract performs strictly worse than the employment contract. 
  In other words a virtue of our model is that it can explain why the employment contract is 
uniquely optimal when Δ > δ and θ is small; why independent contracting is uniquely optimal 
when Δ < δ and θ is small; and why in all the cases considered in this section it makes sense (in 
the absence of systematic cost differences across composers or tasks) for the parties to fix price 
ex ante, i.e., to take price off the table. 
 
5.  External Reference Points 
  So far we have assumed that a prior contract is the only reference point for the transaction 
at date 1.  In this section we relax this assumption.  Our analysis is preliminary and speculative. 
  It is not difficult to think of situations where parties look outside a contract to determine 
whether they are being treated fairly.  A familiar case is where someone is hired as an employee 
at a particular wage, and some time later someone else with comparable or even inferior skills is 
hired by the same employer at a higher wage, perhaps because market conditions have changed.  
The first person will almost certainly feel unhappy about this even though their wage was 
determined fairly and competitively at the time.
32 
  One way to capture the idea of “external” reference points is as follows.  Return to the 
model of Section 3 where the parties trade a standard good but there is uncertainty about v and c.  
Suppose that in each state of the world there is a range of “reasonable” prices for the good, 
                                                           
32 For an interesting discussion of this kind of phenomenon and its implications for labor market practices, see 
Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 31 
determined exogenously, and given by [p min, p max].  The interpretation is that this range is 
based on comparable transactions: trades in other markets at date 1, prices of previous 
transactions, prices embodied in new contracts written between dates 0 and 1, etc.  Any price 
between p min and p max can be justified to outsiders as being reasonable while other prices 
cannot. 
  In order to simplify matters, we will assume that the [c, v] and [p min, p max] intervals 
always intersect; that is, whenever v ≥ c, v ≥ p min and c ≤ p max.  This assumption captures the 
idea that external reference points and internal value and cost are never too far apart. 
  The [p min, p max] range plays two roles.  First, the range may affect entitlements in the 
presence of a contract.  Suppose that the parties’ date 0 contract specifies the range of trading 
prices [p, p].  We saw in Section 3 that, on the basis of this, S feels entitled to receive Min (v, 
p) and B to pay Max (c, p).  We assume that the external reference points [p min, p max] modify 
these entitlements only if (i) p min > Min (v, p) or (ii) Max (c, p) > p max.  In the first case the 
price S feels entitled to receive is raised to p min; while in the second case the price B feels 
entitled to pay is lowered to p max. 
  In other words, S feels entitled to receive more than Min (v, p) if (and only if) all 
external prices lie above Min (v, p), i.e., everybody else in the market is receiving more, and B 
feels entitled to pay less than Max  (c, p) if (and only if) all external prices lie below Max (c, p), 
i.e., everybody else in the market is paying less.  Note that this formulation gives precedence to 
an existing contract in the sense that external reference points come into play only when contract 
prices are far apart from what’s going on elsewhere.  In future work it would be interesting to 
explore alternative ways of modeling the interaction between external reference points and prior 
contracts. 32 
  In summary, S feels entitled to receive Max (Min (v, p), p min) and B to pay Min (Max 
(c, p), p max). 
  Let’s continue with the case where the parties write a date 0 contract [p, p].  The trading 
rule is given by (3.4) and expected surplus by 
 
(5.1) W  =  min), p max, p , c , v ( dF max)}] p ), p   (c, (Max  Min    -   min)   p   ), p (Min(v, {Max    c v [ ∫ − − θ  
         v ≥ c 
         v ≥ p 
         c ≤ p 
 
where we rewrite the distribution function F to reflect the fact that p min and p max can also 
depend on the state of the world.  Note that (5.1) coincides with (3.5) when p min = - ∞, p max = 
∞.  However, shading costs are higher than before when p < p min or p > p max.  Otherwise the 
tradeoff between flexibility and rigidity is essentially as in Section 3: a large [p, p] range makes 
it more likely that trade will occur, but also leads to more shading. 
  Matters become more interesting if the parties write no date 0 contract.  This is where the 
second role of the external reference range [p min, p max] comes in.  Previously we supposed 
that “no contract” was equivalent to setting p = - ∞, p = ∞, i.e., to a very flexible contract.  
However, we now take the view that when the parties bargain at date 1 in the absence of a date 0 
contract, they never consider a price below p min or a price above p max because such prices 
look unreasonable to outsiders (they might not even be enforced by a court).  In other words  it is 
as if the parties had written an initial contract with p = p min andp = p max:  the parties bargain 
in the intersection of the [c, v] and [p min, p max] ranges, and S feels entitled to Min (v, p max) 33 
and B to Max (c, p min).  Given our simplifying assumption that v ≥ p min and c ≤ p max 
whenever v ≥ c, trade will always occur when v > c, and so expected surplus is given by  
 
(5.2) W  =  min) p max, p , c , v ( dF min)}] p , c ( Max max) p , v ( Min { c v [ − − − ∫ θ . 
         v ≥ c 
  
It is easily seen that (5.2) is different from what is obtained by substituting p = - ∞, p = ∞ in 
(5.1).  To underline the point, with external reference points, “no contract” is not the same as a 
highly flexible contract. 
  What determines the choice between writing a date 0 contract and writing “no contract,” 
i.e., leaving things to date 1?  It is good to write an ex ante contract if p min is small and p max is 
large.  In particular, if p min = - ∞, p max = ∞, one can do at least as well as “no contract” by 
writing a contract with p = - ∞, p = ∞ (compare (5.1) and (5.2)); and one can usually do better 
by limiting the [p, p] range.  Another case where it is better to write a date 0 contract is if the 
range [p min, p max] does not vary with the state of the world – in this case, one can do at least 
as well as with no contract by setting p = p min, p = p max. 
  What about cases where “no contract” is optimal?  The leading one is where the range [p 
min, p max] is small.  Under these conditions trade always occurs when it is efficient (by 
assumption, a price can be found in the intersection of the [p min, p max] and [c, v] ranges 
whenever v ≥ c), and shading costs are low.  For example, if p min = p max = p ˆ , “no contract” 
achieves the first-best.   
  A concrete example may be useful.  Consider Example 3.1 of Section 3.  Suppose that p 
min = p max = p ˆ = 4.5 in s1 and p min = p max = p ˆ = 15 in s2.  Previously the date 0 contract p 34 
= 9, p = 10 achieved first-best.  However, this is no longer true: in s1 B will feel aggrieved that 
he pays 9 rather than the (external) price 4.5, and so shades by 4.5 θ; and in s2 S will feel 
aggrieved that she receives 10 rather than the (external) price 15, and so shades by 5 θ. 
  In contrast “no contract” does achieve the first-best.  Under no contract, at date 1 B and S 
agree on a price of 4.5 in s1 and a price of 15 in s2 – there is nothing to argue about because p 
min = p max – and there is no aggrievement or shading in either state.  
  We conclude by mentioning a possible application of the model to explaining contract 
length.  Take our example of a wedding that will occur in six months.  In this case the range of 
reasonable catering prices [p min, p max] is plausibly quite large (there are many different types 
of weddings and caterers) and is unlikely to change much over the next six months.  According 
to our analysis this is a situation where it is better to write an ex ante contract rather than “no 
contract.”  On the other hand, imagine that the wedding will occur five years from now.  There 
may be a great deal of uncertainty about future catering costs and future market prices for 
catering services (and the two may be highly correlated) and, to the extent that the latter acts as a 
reference point for entitlements, fixing a price, or a range of prices, now may create 
aggrievement with high probability.  It may be better to take a wait-and-see attitude and postpone 
contracting. 
  Combining the two cases, i.e., considering a situation of two weddings, one in six months 
and the other in five years, yields the beginnings of a theory of contract length. 
  The above just skims the surface of what is potentially a very interesting and rich set of 
issues.  We leave the details to future research. 
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6.  Renegotiation 
  We now relax the no-renegotiation assumption.  We will in fact consider three views of 
the renegotiation process.  We will see that our results are modified, but not entirely changed, by 
the possibility of renegotiation.  We focus on the models of Sections 3 and 4.   
  One view of renegotiation is that, after the contract refinement process illustrated in 
Figure 1 occurs, the parties will always renegotiate to an efficient outcome, and that the parties 
will rationally anticipate this.  How does this affect our analysis? 
  Start with the model of Section 3.  Suppose B and S write a contract consisting of the 
price range [p,p].  Then after the uncertainty about v, c is resolved at date 1 it is possible that v > 
c and yet either v < p or c >p.  In other words, trade is efficient but won’t occur under the 
contract.   
  According to the first view of renegotiation, B and S will write a new contract.  B will 
feel entitled to p = c and S to p = v.  Total shading is θ (v – c), and net surplus is (1 – θ) (v – c).  
Note that renegotiation does not achieve the first-best whenever θ > 0. 
  This alters the analysis a little.  Take Example 3.2.  Contract (c) is unchanged since no 
renegotiation occurs.  However, the surplus in contracts (a), (b) rises.  Under (a) renegotiation 
will take place if s2 occurs.  Under (b) renegotiation will take place if s1 occurs.  Thus total 
surplus under (a), (b) is now 
 
 W a′ = 9 π1 + 10(1 -θ) π2 + 20 π3, 
 W b′ = 9(1 – θ) π1 + 10 π2 + 20 π3. 
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Contracts (a) or (b) might now beat contract (c) even if, in the absence of renegotiation, they did 
not. 
  How does this view of renegotiation affect the model of Section 4?    Suppose Δ > δ.  
There were two candidates for an optimal contract, (b) and (d).  In contract (b) price is fixed and 
B chooses the composer.  In (d) both price and composer are fixed. 
  Contract (b) leads to an efficient ex post outcome (apart from shading) and so no 
renegotiation will occur.  However, contract (d) leads to inefficiency in either s2 or s3, and so 
now renegotiation will occur in one of these states.  For example, if the contract specifies Bach 
and s3 occurs, S will agree to switch to Shostakovich in return for a side payment.  The gains 
from renegotiation are (Δ – δ), and since there will be aggrievement about how these are split, a 
fraction θ of them will be lost to shading.  Thus surplus under (d) now rises to 
 
  W = ½ (v – c) + ½ (v – c - θ (Δ – δ)) = v – c – ½ θ (Δ – δ). 
 
  One problem with this first view of renegotiation is that it makes a strong assumption 
about the renegotiation process and entitlements within a state.  Consider the switch from Bach 
to Shostakovich in s3 in contract (d).  It is supposed that S feels entitled at most to 100% of the 
surplus from the switch, i.e., to an increase in price from p to p + Δ; and B feels entitled at most 
to 100% of the surplus from the switch, i.e., to an increase in price from p to p + δ.  But in 
principle B and S could use the renegotiation to demand even more: S could argue that, since 
price is “on the table,” p should move all the way up to v, and B could argue that the price should 
move all the way down to c.  In other words each party could demand 100% of all the surplus.  37 
(Recall the voluntary trade assumption: each party has the option to quit.)  Moreover, they may 
feel aggrieved if they don’t get this. 
  We now consider a second view of renegotiation that allows for this possibility.  It takes 
a “thin end of the wedge” approach.  Suppose that if one party proposes a renegotiation 
involving a price change, then both parties recognize that any price change is now possible.  
Assume that the parties will agree to the renegotiation if and only if both parties are made better 
off.  Then contract (d) will be renegotiated in s3 only if  
 
    ½ (v – c) (1 – θ) ≥ v – Δ – p, 
    ½ (v – c) (1 - θ) ≥ p – c + δ, 
 
where we are assuming that the parties split the surplus 50:50.  Adding these inequalities yields 
 
    (v – c) (1 – θ) ≥ v – c – Δ + δ, 
 
which will not be satisfied if, say, Δ − ~  δ.  We see that this second view of renegotiation puts 
some friction into the process: it makes it less likely that the parties will switch from an 
inefficient composer to an efficient composer. 
  Note that this second view of renegotiation coincides with the first view for the model of 
Section 3.  The reason is that renegotiation occurs only if the contract leads to no trade, in which 
case all the surplus is up for grabs anyway. 
  In our opinion both of the above views of renegotiation are rosy.  Each view supposes 
that the possibility of changing price in one state will not affect parties’ feelings of entitlement in 38 
other states.  But this is questionable.  Return to the model of Section 3.  Then, under contract 
(a), the price is raised to at least 10 in s2 as a result of renegotiation.  Given that price is flexible, 
why wouldn’t S feel entitled to a price change in s3?  Of course, if S does think this way, then it 
is as if the contract specified that the price could be in (at least) the [9,10] range in the first place, 
and we are back to contract (c). 
  In our opinion an intellectually more coherent position is that any flexibility in the trading 
price must be built into the initial contract (assuming an initial contract is written at all – see 
Section 5).  That is, one can set p = 9 or p = 10 or pε [9, 10], but one cannot set p = 9 and then 
change it to p = 10. 
  Moreover, as we have discussed elsewhere, we believe that this position is consistent 
with legal practice and social custom.
33  The courts regard contract renegotiations with some 
suspicion and may overturn them if they believe that opportunism or duress has played a role.  
(Social attitudes and norms often mirror the law.)  To this end, the courts require that 
renegotiation must be in “good faith,” but, since this is difficult to monitor, they will often 
substitute the requirement that the renegotiation can be justified objectively, e.g., the price 
increases because the seller is supplying an additional service and her costs have risen.
34  In the 
model of Section 3, no extra service is provided, and so there is no objective justification for a 
price change, say from p = 9 to p = 10.
35  Similarly, there is no justification for a price change in 
the model of Section 4 when S switches from Bach to Shostakovich, given that Shostakovich is 
not objectively (i.e., verifiably) more costly than Bach. 
                                                           
33 See Hart and Moore (2004). 
34 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 84(a)(1979); Farnsworth (1999, pp. 276-95); Jolls (1997, pp. 228-
301); Muris (1981, particularly p. 530); and Shavell (2005). 
35 In fact, without some constraint on price changes, a long-term contract would have little meaning.  Almost every 
contract is incomplete in the sense that some ex ante noncontracted-for cooperation is required ex post for the 
contract to succeed.  If each party can demand a large sidepayment for that cooperation that is completely unrelated 
to costs – you want a glass of water that will cost you $1,000 – the initial contract will be vitiated. 39 
  Given this third view of renegotiation, no renegotiation will occur at all in the models of 
Sections 3 and 4.  Thus this third view of renegotiation is most favorable to our preceding 
analysis: it survives intact. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
  In this paper we have developed a theory of contracts based on the view that a contract 
provides a reference point for a parties’ trading relationship.  The idea is that a contract written 
early on when an external measure of the parties’ contributions to the relationship is provided by 
competitive markets can continue to govern the parties’ feelings of entitlement later when they 
become locked in to each other.  The anchoring of entitlements in turn limits disagreement, 
aggrievement, and the deadweight losses from shading.  We have shown that our theory yields a 
trade-off between contractual rigidity and flexibility, provides a basis for long-term contracts in 
the absence of noncontractible investments, and throws light on the nature of the employment 
relationship.  We have also shown that an extension of our theory that allows for external 
reference points can explain why parties sometimes deliberately write “no contract.” 
  Our theory is based on strong assumptions.  Before considering how these might be 
improved on and relaxed, let us say a little more about why we made them.  In principle one 
could study the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility using more traditional approaches.  For 
example, standard rent-seeking arguments suggest that a flexible contract that “leaves money on 
the table” will generate inefficiency ex post as the parties fight over the surplus.
36  Similarly, 
influence-cost arguments suggest that mechanisms will be costly given that one party will waste 
resources trying to influence the other party’s decision.
37  However, these theories suffer from 
                                                           
36 See, e.g., Tullock (1967). 
37 See, e.g., Milgrom (1988). 40 
the following weakness.  If, as is usually supposed, ex post trade is perfectly contractible, why 
can’t the parties negotiate around the wasteful rent-seeking and influence activities and move 
straight to the ex post efficient outcome (assuming symmetric information)? 
  The main motivation for introducing shading, i.e., for dropping the assumption that ex 
post trade is contractible, and for making associated behavioral assumptions, is to avoid this 
conclusion.
38  In addition our model is tractable and yields intuitive formulae for the costs of 
flexibility.  For example, in Section 4 we saw that letting one party choose the outcome (the 
composer) will lead to little inefficiency if the other party is approximately indifferent about the 
choice.  It is not clear that more traditional approaches generate such a simple (and we think 
reasonable) conclusion. 
  We should make it clear, however, that we are more than happy to consider alternatives 
in future work.  We mention one.  Consider a contract that admits two outcomes, a and b, and 
gives the buyer the right to choose between them.  If the buyer prefers a and the seller b, the 
buyer may have to spend time persuading the seller of the reasonableness of the choice a in order 
to ensure consummate performance by the seller.  These persuasion costs are a plausible 
alternative to the shading costs we have focused on.  Modeling persuasion costs is not easy but it 
is an interesting topic for future research. 
  Let us turn now to how our behavioral assumptions could be refined and relaxed.  Our 
model has a number of “black box” features.  We have made strong and somewhat ad hoc 
assumptions about entitlements, self-serving biases, and shading behavior.  We have not derived 
these from first principles.  Opening up the behavioral black box and showing that these 
                                                           
38But see Bajari and Tadelis (2001).  Bajari and Tadelis consider a model of the trade-off between flexibility and 
rigidity, where rigidity, in the form of a fixed price, is good because it encourages efficient cost reduction by the 
seller S, but bad because it impedes ex post adjustment.  Our model has somewhat similar ex post characteristics to 
Bajari and Tadelis’s, but ignores ex ante incentives for cost minimization.   41 
assumptions are consistent with utility maximizing behavior is an important topic for future 
research. 
  We have also made other strong assumptions.  One is that shading by B and S is 
symmetric.  As mentioned in the text, it is easier to think of examples of S’s shading than of B’s 
shading.  If we supposed no B shading, the model as it stands would collapse: the first-best could 
be achieved by giving S the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B.  S would choose the 
efficient price-output or price-quality combination, thereby extracting all the surplus, and, 
according to standard subgame perfection arguments, B would accept such an offer.  One way to 
avoid this conclusion is to appeal to the ultimatum game literature that argues that B will not 
accept S’s offer unless S gives B a reasonable fraction of the surplus.
39  Knowing this, S will 
allocate some of the surplus to B, but since S feels entitled to all the surplus she will be 
aggrieved and will shade.  A second way to avoid the “first-best” outcome is to suppose that  B 
dislikes feeling “taken advantage of” or “exploited” by S, that is, a contract that allows S to make 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer will cause a psychic loss for B if S chooses not to be generous.  For 
instance, in the wedding example, B might obtain disutility from being gouged ex post by the 
caterer.  This psychic loss is akin to the deadweight loss from shading: the difference is that B 
internalizes it (“eats it”) rather than being able to retaliate and shift it to S.  (One could even 
suppose that S incurs a psychic loss from the fact that S’s offer will be perceived as ungenerous 
by B.)  This approach would bring us closer to that part of the behavioral literature that 
emphasizes loss aversion.
40 
  There are at least two other ways to avoid the “first-best” conclusion when B can’t shade.  
One is to suppose that B must make an ex ante noncontractible investment, so that complete 
                                                           
39See, e.g., Camerer and Thaler (1995) and the references in footnote 9.  
40 See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 42 
hold-up by S is undesirable.  A second is to suppose that S is wealth constrained and so cannot 
compensate B in advance for the 100% of the surplus that S will obtain ex post. 
  A further assumption that we have made is that only the outcome and not the process 
matters for people’s feelings of entitlement and well-being.  This is strong.  Take the 
employment contract in Section 4, in which the price is fixed and B has the right to choose the 
composer.  If B chooses Bach in state s2, which S doesn’t like, S may nonetheless accept and not 
feel aggrieved about this choice given that B had the right to make it.  In other words, S might 
feel differently about the outcome “Bach” if it is the result of a previously agreed process than if 
the outcome is arrived at in some other way, e.g., through bargaining. 
  Generalizing the model to allow for the role of process is highly desirable.  Note that we 
do not think that a well designed process will completely eliminate the costs of flexibility.  In the 
employment example S is likely to accept Bach only if she views B’s choice as “reasonable.”  
Convincing S of this may be costly for B; see the above discussion of persuasion costs.  Thus our 
view is that an appropriately constructed model that allows for the role of process will still 
exhibit an interesting trade-off between contractual flexibility and rigidity. 
  In the Introduction we motivated the paper by pointing out some limitations of existing 
models of the firm.  We believe that the model developed here can help to overcome some of 
those limitations and can be applied to organizational and contract economics more generally.  
We have used the model to understand the nature of the employment relationship, and why 
parties deliberately write “no contract.”  We believe that there are many other possibilities.  We 
end by mentioning a few of these.  First, the model may throw light on the role of the courts in 
filling in the gaps of incomplete contracts.  The idea is that a contractual term provided by the 
parties may affect entitlements whereas one provided by an outsider – the courts – may not.  This 43 
may have efficiency consequences.  Second, along related lines, the model may help to explain 
why parties choose not to index contracts to inflation in order to generate real wage flexibility.  If 
real wages fall because prices rise, this can be blamed on an outsider -- e.g., the government -- 
whereas if nominal wages are reduced by an employer this may generate anger.  Finally, the 
model of Section 4, extended from two to many people, may help us to understand how authority 
should be allocated, i.e., who, out of a group of individuals, should be boss.  We believe that this 
last application may be a useful step in allowing incomplete contracting ideas to be applied to the 
very interesting and important topic of the internal organization of firms. 44 
Appendix A 
 
In this appendix we use the framework of Section 3, first, to refine our assumption about 
what determines a party’s level of aggrievement; and, second, to prove a result giving 
circumstances where we can restrict attention to contracts in which the no-trade price p0 is zero 
and one party unilaterally chooses the terms of trade. 
  To see why a refinement is required, consider a slight variant of the three-state example 
from Section 3: 
 
    s 1    s2   s3 
  v     9   20   10 
  c      0    1 0        9  
 
The only change is that in state s3 the (v,c) pair equals (10,9) rather than (20,0).  All the analysis 
of contracts (a) – (c) still pertains, except that now they yield expected total surplus of 
Wa = 9 π1 + π3, 
Wb = 10 π2 + π3, 
Wc = 9 π1 + 10 π2 + (1 – θ) π3, 
 
respectively.  As before, in general none of these contracts achieves first-best. 
Now consider contract (e), in which p0 ≡ 0 and B chooses p1 from a set of three discrete 
prices, {8½, 9½, 10½}.  If we think of a contract where p1 must lie in an interval [p, p] as a 45 
“standard” contact (and p = p as a “simple” contract), then, unlike contracts    (a) – (c), contract 
(e) is “non-standard”. 
  On the face of it, contract (e) achieves first-best because in each state only one p1 out of 
the three allowable prices delivers trade (remember trade is voluntary, so each party has to be 
better off than not trading at p0 = 0).  Surely, this means that there is no source of aggrievement? 
We take the view that this is the wrong answer:  contract (e) will generate aggrievement 
and hence shading.  The reason is that in state s3, when B chooses p1 = 9½, S will feel aggrieved 
that B didn’t choose a 50:50 lottery between p1 = 9½ and p1 = 10½, with B committing to trade 
whatever the outcome of the lottery.  The 50:50 odds are such that before the lottery, B would be 
no worse off than not trading, given that he values the widget at 10.  At a price of 9½, then, S 
feels aggrieved by ½.  Equally, B feels aggrieved by ½ too!  Even though he has the contractual 
right to choose p1, and chooses 9½, he would prefer to choose a 50:50 lottery between p1 = 8½ 
and p1 = 9½, with S committing to trade whatever the outcome: before the lottery, S would be no 
worse off than not trading, given that the widget costs her 9.  In aggregate, shading in state s3 
amounts to (½ + ½)θ, which is the same as under contract (c).  Worse, in state s1, when B 
chooses p1 = 8½, S feels aggrieved that B didn’t choose a 50:50 lottery between p1 = 8½ and p1 = 
9½, with B committing to trade whatever the outcome, so that in this state there is shading.  
Similarly, there is shading in state s2. All in all, contract (e) is strictly dominated by contract (c). 
We are adopting the position that when he or she thinks how aggrieved to feel, a party  
(A1) conjures with mixed strategies in the contractual mechanism (and with 
        correlated strategies if the mechanism has simultaneous moves);  
(A2) imagines a commitment to trade on the part of the other party, whatever the 
        outcome of the randomization.   46 
However, no-one believes they can force the other party beyond his or her participation 
constraint.  Specifically, no-one thinks they can push the other party’s expected payoff below 
what he or she could get from simply walking away prior to the randomization, refusing to trade. 
  If the no-trade price p0 varies with the strategies, and cannot simply be normalized to 
zero, then it is a little less obvious how these participation constraints should be factored into the 
parties’ thinking. 
  Consider a contract (f) in which B chooses (p1, p0) from a set of three pairs:  
(9, 1), (9½, ½) or (10, 0).  If there is no shading, then in state s1 B will choose (p1, p0) = (9, 1), 
leading to trade at a price of 9 – actually, he is indifferent between this outcome and choosing 
(p1, p0) = (10, 0), leading to no trade at p0 = 0.  In state s3 B will choose  (p1, p0) = (9½, ½), 
leading to trade at a price of 9½ – if he chose (p1, p0) = (9, 1) then S would not trade.  In state s2 
B will choose (p1, p0) = (10, 0), the only price pair at which S will trade. 
  Again, on the face of it, if we do not invoke (A1) or (A2), contract (f) looks attractive.  It 
could be argued that, since B is choosing the pair (p1, p0) he is never aggrieved.  And the contract 
has been cleverly designed so that in state s3 S is aggrieved by only ½.  She would increase her 
payoff by ½ if, instead of B choosing (p1, p0) =     (9½, ½) leading to trade at p1 = 9½, B were to 
choose (p1, p0) = (9, 1) leading to no trade at p0 = 1; equally, S would increase her payoff by ½ if 
B were to choose (p1, p0) = (10, 0) leading to trade at p1 = 10.  Arguably, then, shading in state s3 
amounts to ½θ – half that under contract (c).  Likewise, in state s1 there is shading of ½θ because 
S would prefer B to choose (p1, p0) = (9½, ½) leading to trade at p1 = 9½; and in state s2 there is 
shading of θ because S would prefer B to choose (p1, p0) = (9, 1) leading to no trade at p0 = 1.  
Overall, it therefore could be argued that expected total surplus from contract (f) is  
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(9 – ½θ) π1 + (10 – θ) π2 + (1 – ½θ) π3, 
 
which means that if, for example, π1 + 2π2 < π3 and θ = 1, contract (f) would dominate contracts 
(a), (b) and (c). 
  Once (A1) and, in particular, (A2) are invoked, however, this conclusion changes.  To see 
why, we first need to check what would happen under contract (f) if either party walked away 
and refused to trade.  B would minimize p0 by choosing (p1, p0) = (10, 0). So, in reckoning how 
low they can push the other’s payoff, each party thinks in terms of a default no-trade price of p0
* 
= 0. Precisely, p0
* is the right-hand side (RHS) of S’s participation constraint; and (– p0
* ) is the 
RHS of B’s participation constraint. 
  Knowing this, we can invoke (A2) to calculate aggrievement levels in each state.  In 
particular, in state s3, when B chooses (p1, p0) = (9½, ½), B is actually aggrieved by ½ because 
he would prefer to choose (p1, p0) = (9, 1), with S committing to trade – from (A2), we see that 
this would not violate S’s participation constraint given p0
* = 0.  S is also aggrieved by ½ 
because she would prefer B to choose (p1, p0) = (10, 0) and commit to trade.  In aggregate, 
shading in state s3 amounts to (½ + ½)θ – the same as under contract (c).  One can in fact show 
that the two contracts, (f) and (c), deliver the same expected total surplus. 
  All this begs the question: assuming (A1) and (A2), can non-zero values of p0 ever help?  
If not, to find an optimal contract, can we narrow down the class that we need to consider, e.g., 
restrict attention to contracts in which one party unilaterally chooses the terms of trade? 
  A general contract C can be viewed as a stochastic mechanism mapping from a pair of 
messages β and σ, reported by B and S respectively, onto either a pair of (trade, no-trade) prices, 
(p1, p0), or onto simply a no-trade price, p0.  In other words, following the report of messages β 48 
and σ, there is an exogenous lottery to determine (i) if trade is allowed or not; (ii) the terms of 
trade/no-trade.  If trade is allowed then it occurs if and only if both parties want it (at price p1).  
Otherwise, there is no trade (at price p0).  (Remember we are assuming no renegotiation, so if the 
mechanism specifies no trade then that outcome is final.) 
  In effect, then, a mechanism allows for probabilistic trade – a surrogate for fractional 
trade (our widget is assumed to be indivisible). 
  Under contract C, p* (the default no-trade price used to determine the RHS’s of the 
parties’ participation constraints) is the value of the zero-sum game over the p0’s specified in the 
mechanism – under the supposition that one or other party “quits”, i.e. always chooses to veto 
trade, so that the specified p1’s are irrelevant.  Let  ) * ~ , * ~
( σ β  be the (possibly mixed) equilibrium 
strategies of this zero-sum message game. 
  We consider, for each state (v, c), a (possibly mixed strategy) subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the game induced by contract C.  Let q(v, c) be the probability of trade in  
equilibrium, and p(v, c) the expected payment from B to S.  Since trade is voluntary, q(v, c) > 0 
only if v ≥ c.  If there is more than one equilibrium, we pick the one that maximizes q(v, c). 
  No party is worse off than if he or she quit: 
 
Lemma  vq(v, c) - p(v, c) ≥ – p0*, 
    p(v, c) - cq(v, c) ≥ p0*. 
 
Proof    Consider B.  In state (v, c) he could deviate from his equilibrium  message-
reporting-cum-trading strategy to report  * ~
β and always refuse to trade.  Were he to do so, his 
payoff would drop from vq(v, c) – p(v, c) to, say, ( 0 ˆ p − ), where  0 ˆ p  is the ensuing (expected) no-49 
trade price.  But  0 ˆ p cannot be any less than p0*, because  * ~ σ is a best reply to  * ~
β for S in the 
zero-sum game over the p0’s.  This proves the first inequality in the Lemma.  The second follows 
symmetrically – reversing the roles of B and S. 
QED 
 
  For future reference, let  R H × ⊆ ] 1 , 0 [ denote the convex hull of (0, 0) and all pairs 
{q(v, c) , p(v, c) – p0*}, 
where, notice, we are netting prices by subtracting p0*.  In the space of quantity (q) and net price 
(p - p0*), the set H might look as follows: 
 
 
  Invoking (A1) and (A2), in state (v, c) we define B’s [resp. S’s] “aspiration level” b(v, c) 
[resp. s(v, c)] to be his [resp. her] maximum payoff across all correlated message pairs and 
trading rules subject to the constraint that S [resp. B] gets no less than p0* [resp. (– p0*)]. 
1 q 
p - p0
* 
0 
H 
Figure 3 50 
  In particular, B and S each imagine that they could jointly precommit to the (mixed) 
message-cum-trading equilibrium strategies pertaining to some other state, or some convex 
combination thereof.   
 
Hence 
(i) 
p q
c v b
,
max ) , ( ≥ {vq – p|  * *) , ( 0 0 p cq p and H p p q ≥ − ∈ − }, 
 (ii) 
p q
c v s
,
max ) , ( ≥ {p – cq|  * *) , ( 0 0 p p vq and H p p q − ≥ − ∈ − }. 
 
Note that, thanks to the Lemma, 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c v p c v vq c v b − ≥ , 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c v cq c v p c v s − ≥ ,                                                                                                  
i.e., aspiration levels are at least as high as equilibrium payoffs. 
 
  In each state (v, c), once equilibrium play is over, B shades by reducing S’s payoff down 
to 
{} )] , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c v p c v vq c v b c v cq c v p − − − − θ . 
 
And S shades by reducing B’s payoff down to  
 
{} )] , ( ) , ( [ ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( c v cq c v p c v s c v p c v vq − − − − θ . 
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Hence, in the special case θ = 1 (the case considered in the Proposition below), total surplus in 
this equilibrium equals 
 
(iii)  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( 2 c v s c v b c v q c v − − − . 
 
  Now consider contract Ĉ, in which p0 ≡ 0 and one party (say B – it doesn’t matter who) 
chooses from a set of exogenous lotteries, each corresponding to a different point  H p q ∈ ) , (:  
with probability q, trade is allowed at 
q
p
p = 1 ,                                                           
with probability 1-q, trade is not allowed. 
 
At first sight contract Ĉ may look a little strange, but that is because it is dealing with 
probabilistic trade.  Note that for q = 1 – corresponding to the right-hand edge of the set H in 
Figure 3 – contract Ĉ is nothing more than our “standard” contract in which B chooses a trading 
price p1 from an interval [p,p].  To put this another way, if the upper and lower edges of the set 
H in Figure 3 were linear rather than piecewise linear, H would correspond to a standard 
contract. 
    
Proposition Suppose  θ = 1.  Then contract Ĉ yields at least as much total surplus in each state 
as does contract C. 
 
Proof   Under  contact  Ĉ, in state (v, c), B’s aspiration level is 
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p q
c v b
,
max ) , ( ˆ = {vq – p| 0 ) , ( ≥ − ∈ cq p and H p q } 
 
(iv)     ≤ p0* + b(v, c)  
 
by (i).  And S’s aspiration level is 
p q
c v s
,
max ) , ( ˆ = {p – cq| 0 ) , ( ≥ − ∈ p vq and H p q } 
 
(v)  ≤ – p0* + s(v, c)  
 
by (ii).  In each state (v, c), B chooses the lottery corresponding to a point  H p q ∈ ) , ( to 
maximise his net payoff (i.e. net of S’s shading), taking into account that S may not be willing to 
trade at 
q
p
p = 1  for q ≠ 0.  That is, given θ = 1, B chooses  H p q ∈ ) , (  to maximise  
 
{} ] [ ) , ( ˆ cq p c v s p vq − − − −  subject to p – cq ≥ 0. 
 
If v > c, in effect B will maximise the probability of trade, q, subject to  H p q ∈ ) , (  for 
some p ≥ cq.  Call this maximum ) , ( ˆ c v q .  But from the definition of the set H, 
 
  H p c v p c v q ∈ − *) ) , ( ), , ( ( 0 ; 
 
and from the second inequality in the Lemma, 53 
 
 ) , ( * ) , ( 0 c v cq p c v p ≥ − . 
 
Hence ) , ( ˆ c v q is at least q(v, c) whenever v > c.   
 
If v < c, B will choose (q, p) = (0, 0); in this case set  ) , ( ˆ c v q = 0. 
 
  Combining these two cases, we have 
 
(vi) 0 )] , ( ) , ( ˆ )[ ( ≥ − − c v q c v q c v  in all states (v, c). 
 
  Just as total surplus in state (v, c) was given by expression (iii) under contract C, so too 
under contract Ĉ it is given by 
 
(vii)  ). , ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ ) , ( ˆ ) ( 2 c v s c v b c v q c v − − −  
 
But, making use of inequalities (iv) – (vi), we see that the expression in (vii) is no less than that 
in (iii). 
          Q E D  
 
  In words, the Proposition states that, without loss of generality, p0 can be normalized to 
zero and one party (B, say) can be given control over the terms of trade.  The subset H of 
R × ] 1 , 0 [  is the “design variable”.  It is this set that the contract specifies, taking any shape (along 54 
the lines of that in Figure 3) – but it must be convex and, for q = 0, come to a point at the origin 
(i.e., when q = 0, p = p0* = 0). 
 
Of course, the weakness of this result is that it applies only to the limit case θ = 1.  
However the Proposition is suggestive of other more general results.  For example, it may be 
quite general that (A1) and (A2) are enough to allow us to ignore the possibility of non-zero 
values of p0.  The Proposition as it stands may apply if θ is close enough to 1.  And for lower 
values of θ, somewhat more complex allocations of control rights over the terms of trade (not 
merely giving unilateral control to either B or S) may turn out to be optimal.  All this awaits 
further research. 
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Appendix B 
 
In this appendix we prove Proposition 4.1. 
Think of composers as lying in the [0, 1] interval, with λ = 0 corresponding to Bach and λ 
= 1 corresponding to Shostakovich.  In state s2, the value of composer λ to B is v – λΔ, and the 
cost to S is c – λδ.  (That is, λ is equivalent to a convex combination of Bach and Shostakovich.)  
In state s3, the value of λ to B is v – (1 – λ) Δ, and the cost to S is c – (1 – λ) δ. 
As a preliminary, we should observe that if no music is played in state s4 then in the 
other three states the first-best could be achieved using a contract that fixes the price at v and has 
B choose the composer.  In state s2, B would choose λ = 0 (as first-best requires) but there would 
be no aggrievement on the part of S since at price v no other composer would satisfy B’s 
participation constraint.  Likewise in state s3, B would choose λ = 1 and there would be no 
aggrievement.  In state s1, there would be no aggrievement either (B could choose any 
composer).  At this high price B would be unwilling to trade in state s4.  Overall, expected total 
surplus would be (1 – π4)(v – c).  For small enough π4, this would be the optimal contract.  But 
we see this as a peculiar case, which we can later confirm is ruled out if π4/(1 – π1) is above the 
lower bound in Proposition 4.1.  (Incidentally, this is the role of state s4 in the model when Δ > 
δ.  State s1 plays an analogous role when Δ < δ.) 
From now on, we suppose that music is played in state s4, at price p4, which must lie 
below B’s value, v – Δ.  It is straightforward to confirm that in states s2, s3 and s4 music is also 
played under an optimal contract.  Let the price be p1 in state s1.  In state s2, suppose composer 
λ2 is played at price p2.  Since we are restricting attention to symmetric contracts, in state s3 
composer 1 – λ2 is played, also at price p2.   56 
    The method we will use to characterize an optimal contract is to include in our 
mathematical programme only those inequality constraints that are critical.  At the end, we will 
need to confirm that the (many) missing constraints are satisfied.  In particular, for now we shall 
ignore the question of who controls the choice of composer and price. 
 Let  a2 be the total level of aggrievement (B’s plus S’s) in state s2 when λ2 is played at 
price p2. (By symmetry, a2 is also the total level of aggrievement in state s3.)  Now S may prefer 
to switch from composer λ2 to composer 1 – λ2 at the same price p2 (which is admissible in the 
contract, since that is what occurs in state s3), to reduce her costs from c – λ2δ to c – (1 – λ2)δ – 
unless this switch would violate B’s participation constraint, v – (1 – λ2)Δ – p2 ≥ 0, in which case 
the best S could wish for is to switch to composer 
Δ
− 2 p v
 at price p2 and reduce her costs from c 
– λ2δ to  δ
Δ
−
−
2 p v
c .  Thus 
 
(i) a2  ≥  δ min {1 – 2λ2, 
Δ
− 2 p v
 – λ2}. 
 
Let a1 be the total level of aggrievement in state s1. Given that p4 ≤ v – Δ, a1 must be at 
least p2 – v + Δ, irrespective of the price p1 (if p1 does not lie between v – Δ and p2 then a1 will 
be higher still): 
 
(ii) a1 ≥ p2 – v + Δ. 
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 If  a4 is the total level of aggrievement in state s4, consider the relaxed programme: 
Choose λ2, p2, a1, a2 and a4 to maximize 
 
(iii) W  ≡ π1 [v – c – θa1] 
      + (1 – π1 – π4)[v – c – λ2(Δ – δ) – θa2] 
         +   π4 [v – c – Δ + δ – θa4] 
 
subject to (i), (ii) and the constraint that total aggrievement is always nonnegative: 
 
(iv) a1 ≥ 0 , a2 ≥ 0 , a4 ≥ 0. 
 
  In a solution to this relaxed programme, the tighter of the lower bound constraints on a1 
will bind.  Likewise for a2.  And a4 = 0. 
Now consider the role of p2, which affects W in (iii) only via a1 and a2.  Via a1, the slope 
of W w.r.t. p2 is (–π1θ) if p2 ≥ v – Δ, and is zero otherwise.  Via a2, the slope of W w.r.t. p2 is at 
most (1 – π1 – π4)θδ/Δ, and is zero if p2 < v – (1 – λ2)Δ.  Hence, from the lower bound on π1/(1– 
π4) in Proposition 4.1, p2 should be as small as possible.  However, there is no value in pushing 
p2 below v – Δ since this would not affect W. 
  Next, consider the role of λ2∈[0, 1], given p2 = v – Δ.   λ2 affects W only through the 
middle term in (iii), and via a2.  Values of λ2 above ½ are clearly not optimal.  If Δ > (1 + 2θ)δ, 
λ2 should be zero; whereas if Δ < (1 + 2θ)δ, λ2 should equal ½.  These are two conditions that 
appear in Proposition 4.1. 
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  Where does this leave us?  On the one hand, if Δ > (1 + 2θ)δ we can implement the above 
solution to the relaxed programme (viz., p2 = v – Δ,  λ2 = 0, a1 = a4 = 0 and a2 = δ) using a 
contract in which the price is fixed at v – Δ and B chooses the composer.  (Actually, any fixed 
price between c and v – Δ would yield the same W.)  On the other hand, if Δ < (1 + 2θ)δ we can 
implement the solution (viz. p2 = v – Δ, λ2 = ½ and a1 = a2 = a4 = 0) using a contract in which the 
price is again fixed at v – Δ, but so too is the composer, at λ2 = ½.  (Actually in this latter case, it 
doesn’t matter which composer is fixed; it could instead be Bach, λ2 = 0.)  The fact that in all 
cases the solution to the relaxed programme can be implemented using some contract vindicates 
our earlier decision to omit the other inequality constraints. 
 
Proposition 4.1 is proved.                                                                       
QED 
 
 
  The reader may wonder why the auxiliary condition π1/(1 – π4) ≥  δ/(Δ + δ) is needed in 
Proposition 4.1.  Consider the following variant to a simple employment contract:  the basic 
wage is v – Δ in return for performing λ = ½, but B can pay a supplement Δ/2 in return for asking 
S to perform some λ in [0,1].  In states s1 and s4, B will pay the basic wage only and λ =  ½ will 
be performed.  And in state s2 [resp. s3], B will pay the supplement and ask S to perform λ = 0 
[resp. λ = 1] – note that without factoring in the impact of shading by S, B is indifferent about 
paying the supplement in states s2 and s3, but it can be checked that S shades even more if B 
does not pay it.  In each of states s1, s2 and s3, S would wish that B had paid the supplement and 
asked her to perform λ = ½.  So she is aggrieved by Δ/2 in state s1, and by δ/2 in states s2 and s3.  59 
(In state s2, it would be unreasonable for S to wish that B had asked her to perform any   λ > ½ 
because that would violate B’s participation constraint.  Similarly, in state s3, any  λ < ½ would 
be unreasonable.)  In state s4, S cannot wish that B pay more than his value, v – Δ, so there is no 
aggrievement.  Overall, then, the contract yields expected total surplus  
 
π1 [v – c – θ(Δ/2)] + (1 – π1 – π4)[v – c – θ(δ/2)] + π4 [v – c – Δ + δ]. 
 
This can be strictly greater than the expected total surplus yielded by any simple employment 
contract if the auxiliary condition π1/(1 – π4) ≥  δ/(Δ + δ) is not satisfied.  For example, if v = 20, 
c = 10, Δ = 6, δ = 2, π1 = 0.1 and π4 = 0.5, then the above contract yields an expected total surplus 
8 – (7θ/10), whereas the best simple employment contract (viz., B chooses any λ, and the wage is 
fixed at v – Δ) yields only 8 – (4θ/5). 60 
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